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NOTE
FINDING FENCES IN CYBERSPACE: PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND
OPEN ACCESS ON THE INTERNET
Ethan Preston*
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Language, Facts and the Law
The Internet challenges our legal system because it makes legal
outcomes uncertain. Particularly, laws made to protect computers on the
Internet and computer security are applied unpredictably. Novel situations
always place unique strains on the law; the law is sensitive both to equity
and language.1 Law is based on language; law that diverges from the
language that forms its base risks incoherence. Incoherent law is
unpredictable. At the same time, facts develop and evolve much more
rapidly than language, but injustice ensues if the law does not respond to
changing circumstances.
This article assumes that legal decisions about the Internet will
continue to be based in partially on property rights. Application of
property rights to the Internet is important. Without property rights,
computer owners may not be willing to connect to the Internet if their
computers can be abused without legal remedy. However, application of
property rights to the Internet is also problematic. Much of the efficiency
associated with the Internet derives from the Internet's open nature.
Almost all use of the Internet involves the use of computers that are not
one' s own. A regime of untrammeled property rights would assign liability
to nearly all uses of the Internet. Internet users would be at the mercy of
computer owners' whims. Without some provision for open access,
liability for violations for property rights will chill productive use of the
Internet. To some extent, this is intuitive. Connecting to the Internet
implies some willingness to permit others to interact with one's computer.
The law must balance between property rights and open access on the
Internet. A central assumption of this article is that a limited license must

* Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2001.
1. Equity is defined as "U]ustice administered according to fairness [rather than according
to the letter of the Iaw]."BLACK's LAw DIcIoNARY 540 (6th ed. 1990).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFTECHNOLOGY LAW& POUCY

[Vol. 6

be implied by a connection to the Internet.2 The central concern of this
article is not whether interactions on the Internet are sometimes free of
liability, but rather determining which interactions are a basis for liability
and which are not.
To that end, this article argues that computer law could benefit from
abstraction. Specifically, this article argues that computer security law
would be more coherent and protect equity more predictably if it treated
the Internet as if it were physical place-cyberspace. Of course,
"cyberspace" is not a place, but a metaphor for a medium of
telecommunication. 3 This article's argument may be counter-intuitive:
abstraction usually obscures the facts on which the law depends.4
Telecommunication will always be distinguished from physical presence,
regardless of how similar an experience the two become. Legal doctrines
that confuse the two would make the law less coherent, less predictable
and therefore less efficient. But using cyberspace as a metaphor does not
require that we confuse cyberspace with a real place, only that we make
rules that approximate the effect of how our property rules would function
if cyberspace were real. If we use the metaphor instead to classify the
interests that must be protected and clarify when they are to be protected,
it can simplify and unify the law. This makes the law more predictable and
therefore more efficient.
The remainder of this section will argue that the law could profitably
adopt the use of the cyberspace metaphor. Section II develops the
metaphor, describing how it accommodates the values of property, privacy
and open access. Section III discusses some of the novel factual
circumstances that necessitate use of the metaphor. Section IV will
examine the potential impact of the metaphor in three specific areas of
law: trespass to chattels 5 lawsuits in context of Internet-connected

2. A license is defined as "[a] personal privilege to do some particular act or series of acts
on land without possessing any [property] interest therein, and is ordinarily revocable at the will
of the licensor [that is, the landowner], and is not assignable [that is, transferable to someone else.]"
Id., at 919. An implied license is "one that presumed to have been given from the acts of the party
authorized to give it." hi, at 920.
3. In Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,849-50 (1997), the Supreme Court described the Internet
as "an international network of interconnected computers ...a unique and wholly new medium of
human communication."

4. Abstraction is defined as the "formation of an idea apart from concrete things, situations,
etc." LEXICON PUBUCATIONS, WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 4 (1987).
5. Chattels are defined as "personal property, as distinguished from real property." BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 236. Trespass to chattels is defined as "unlawful and serious
interference with the possessory rights of another to personal property.... [In contrast] every
unauthorized and direct breach of the boundaries of another's land was an actionable trespass." Id.
at 1503.

NOTE

computers, computer fraud laws, and the anti-circumvention provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
B. Historical Use of the CyberspaceMetaphor
The metaphor of the Internet as a phvsical olace is entrenched in our
DoDular culture. Popular wisdom credits science fiction author William
Gibson with coining the term "cvbersoace. ' '6 CvbersDace referred to
futuristic computer interfaces which eraDhicallv represented comouters as
physical spaces that accommodated data, represented by physical objects.7
As a literary device, cyberspace may now be a somewhat hackneyed
metaphor.8 While popular use might imply a common understanding and
therefore some utility, literary history provides a cautionary tale about
investing too much in a metaphor.
Professor Lessig's Code argues that the interplay between both
technical and legal regulation govern cyberspace. 9 For instance, Lessig
makes a comparison between the cyberplaces of Harvard and the
University of Chicago Law Schools. Harvard University requires network
users to register their computers, so their users can be "licensed, approved
and verified."10 The University of Chicago permits anyone with an
Ethernet connection to plug into a jack on the campus." The University of

6. But see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OFCYBERSPACE 5 (1999) (positing
the first instances of the word cyberspace in the field of cybernetics, predating Gibson's
publication).
7. Cyberspace was described as a "consensual hallucination... a graphic representation of
data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system.... mhe interior of a given
data construct possessed unlimited subjective dimension; a child's toy calculator ... would have
presented limitless gulfs of nothingness hung with a few basic commands." WILLAM GIBSON,
NEUROMANCER 51, 63 (1984). "In this fictional world of cyberspace, 'computer cowboys'
neurologically patch themselves into computer networks where matrices of electronic data become
cerebral manifestations. Without keyboards or data, cowboys navigate through data of individuals,
firms and governments as if the cowboys were suspended in a surreal fourth dimension." Michael
P. Diercks, Computer Network Abuse, 6 HARv. J. LAW & TECHL. 307, 307 n. 1 (1993).
8. A lot of silly stuff came out of [the genre which William Gibson pioneered.]
beforehand, when you were on the internet you were merely slouched out in a
chair, typing onto a compuserve message board or something. Afterwards, you
were flying bodilessly through cyberspace, a creature of pure data, communing
with other cyberbeings through virtual reality. It's taken years to get people to

stop talking that way, not to mention believing some of that bunkum.
Gavin McNett, The Ambivalent Cyberpunk at http://www.salon.com/bookslfeature/
2000/10/30/sterling/index.html (Oct. 30, 2000).
9. See LESSIG, supra note 6.
10. Id., at 26.
11. See id.
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Chicago permits anonymous speech, while Harvard effectively forbids it.'2
The difference in technical regulation of the Internet creates different legal
implications. Throughout Code, Lessig refers to cyberplaces, extensively
describing how their architecture is shaped but not explicitly addressing
cyberspace as a metaphor. 3 A few other legal commentators have
implicitly endorsed cyberspace as a metaphor. 4 If legal commentary about
the law and the Internet endorses this metaphor, perhaps it is efficient for
the law to do so as well.
C. The Law's Use of Metaphors
Metaphors are incorporated into the law for the purpose of "set[ting]
forth principles and dispens[ing] justice (i.e., equality) and provid[ing]
predictability ... or at least to create the impression that [courts are]
principled." 5 Important examples include the "wall of separation between
church and state"16 and "sticks" that compose "the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property" in the context of takings cases. 7
Caution is merited in endorsing a metaphor. Some metaphors may
successfully provide guidance or principles but some fail to do so.' 9
Our legal system should use the metaphor of cyberspace because it is
capable of providing guidance and clarifying the interests in sometimes
confusing factual circumstances. Often complex factual situations can be
easily conceptualized by metaphor. If this metaphor eases

12. See id.
13. See id., at 63-84 (describing how the various architectures of America Online, Counsel
Connect, an NYU multi-user dungeon (MUD), and a law school email list permitted different types
of control and embodied different types of values).
14. See, e.g., Michael Johns, Comment, The FirstAmendment and Cyberspace: Trying to
Teach Old Doctrines New Tricks, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1383 (1996); Harold Reeves Smith,
Comment, Propertyin Cyberspace, 63. U. CH. L. REV. 761 (1996).
15. See, generally,Stephen J. Saphranek, CanScience GuideLegalArgumentation?The Role
ofMetaphorinConstitutionalCases, 25 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 357,358 (1994); see also id., at 358 nn.
9-10; A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is Key: Cryptography, The Clipper Chip and the
Constitution, 143 U. PA. L REV. 709, 859-62 (1995).
16. See, e.g., Bd. OfEduc. v. Allen, 326 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Bd of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878); Michael P. Diercks, supra note 7.
17. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419, 435 (1982);
KaiserAetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
18. See Saphranek, supra note 16, at 401-02 (appraising "bundle of rights" metaphor as
generally successful).
19. See id., at 398 (discussing the failure of the wall metaphor); see also id., at 372 n. 80
(citing Allegheny County v. GreaterPittsburghALCU, 492 USC 593 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 US 38 (1985); Committeefor Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 US 646 (1980)
as cases where the Supreme Court has directly or indirectly disclaimed reliance on the wall
metaphor).
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conceptualization and that ease in turn improves the predictability of
liability, then the metaphor promotes legal efficiency. Moreover, this
metaphor could provide more flexibility in allocating liability than
statutory language. Statutory language suffers from its static nature; it
never changes while it is applied against a myriad of factual
circumstances. Section IV.B discusses this specific point is greater detail,
comparing the cyberspace metaphor against computer crime laws.
II. FINDING FENCES

A. Fences and Property
The metaphor of cyberspace permits us to draw property lines and
borders on the Internet. One of the central tenets of property jurisprudence
is that property is the legal right to exclude others. 20 By defining which
interactions with a computer transgress property lines in cyberspace (and
therefore violate computer owners' property rights) the law can assign
liability consistently and promote equity without losing coherence.
Harold Reeves Smith argued that Internet-related law could be made
more efficient when dealing with certain issues by allocating property
rights to system administrators. 21 He argued that property rights would be
most efficiently allocated to system administrators because they would be
most likely to provide de facto enforcement of those rights.22 Hence,
system administrators would be able to make most efficient use of
property rights. This article is, in part, a modification of Smith's argument.
The right to exclude should adhere to parties who have the ability to

20. "The essence of private property is always the right to exclude others." MoRs R.
COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 46 (1967). See also Loretto, 458 US at 435 ("The power
to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle
of property rights").
21. See Harold Reeves Smith, supra note 14, at 778.
22. To date, the battles for system security and user privacy have been fought almost
entirely at the system level. [smith uses the system level as shorthand to refer to
a network bordered by a firewall and controlled by a system administrator.] the
system administrator, charged with constructing and maintaining the system-level
firewall, is in the best position to protect security and privacy through the use of
that firewall. The firewall prevents infiltration not only by shielding it from
viruses spreading across the internet but also by shutting out hackers set on either
sabotaging the system or accessing individual files and e-mail records. [t]he
system administrator is more likely than the individual users of his system to
possess the technical expertise needed to protect security and privacy effectively.
Id. at 770 (citations omitted). It is worth pointing out that the firewall may be the first line of
defense against computer security violations, but it cannot be the only component in a
comprehensive, effective security regime. See Stephen Reed, BeyondFirewalls,PC World, August,
2000, at 46.
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implement technical measures of exclusion, regardless of whether they are
system administrators or not.
The Internet is like a physical place where people constantly wander
in and out of other people's property, typically with the owner's
permission. In the real world, fences provide obvious boundaries, which
may be otherwise lacking. Fences efficiently coincide with limits of legal
liability because fences provide notice that others are meant to be excluded
from the property. Liability for climbing over fences is efficient because
it is predictable; fences provide notice that property rights have been
asserted. Exclusionary technical measures in cyberspace and fences in the
real world share the same functions. The relationship between fences and
property law supplies the first corollary to the developing metaphor.
Liability attaches in cyberspace only when people jump over fences. In
real world terms, computer owners should be able to assert their property
rights (in the form of imposing liability) only when users have
circumvented technical measures that should have prevented the litigated
use. This rule engenders several benefits. Judicial efficiency is promoted
when prospective plaintiffs are required to at least try to fix the problem
themselves before turning to the courts. Also, exclusionary technical
measures reinforce legal rules about property and they provide concrete
notice of assertion of property rights. Finally, this corollary checks
property rights and provides the proper balance between property rights
and open access. One might object that it may be difficult to define
precisely where fences lie or what exactly constitutes an effective
technical measure. This objection is based on a misapprehension of the
function of legal metaphors. No legal metaphor functions as a formula
which robotically provides legal results. Judges interpret, adapt and apply
legal metaphors to the specific facts before them. Judges using metaphors
decide cases, not the metaphors themselves. This metaphor is meant to
provide judges and others with a vehicle with which to make decisions that
account for open access and privacy, as well as for property.
There are several other valid objections to the metaphor. It is
inadequate to define property rights according to notice given by owners
to others. Notice does not suffice for several reasons. Basing legal rights
on the assertion of legal rights simply begs the question. While people can
assert rights that they do not have, they can also fail to assert rights that
they should have. This is especially true in the field of computer security,
where security violations often occur precisely because an owner or
operator has not anticipated a particular activity. Failure to anticipate an
activity usually precludes explicitly prohibiting them to others. Finally,
situations arise where a owner might be able to erect technical measures
that protect some property rights but those measures nevertheless fail to
provide users notice that property rights are to be excluded.

NOTE

Other sound objections could be made over technical measures
defining property rights. It may not be possible to build fences or establish
effective technical measures. Effective technical measures may be
unreasonably expensive or unavailable altogether. Another potential
criticism is that legal recourse would never be needed for perfectly
effective technical measures. These are valid objections; any property
system based on technical measures must be tempered by the practicality
of implementing those technical measures. Property owners should only
be penalized for failing to implement effective technical measures only
where there are measures reasonably available. There is a subtle efficiency
gain here. Potential plaintiffs, concerned that their claim might fail
because they did not use effective technical measures, will investigate
whether technical measures are efficient. The record of this investigation
can be used to prove that technical measures would have been inefficient
or ineffective.
B. Property and Privacy
Another set of concerns focus on how the law decides who gets to erect
fences. Fences should not be built over neighbors' land. As this article
elaborates in Section IV.C, technical measures used to protect copyrights
can be quite invasive and controversial. At the extreme, a recent
trojan/worm not only gave the trojan's user unlimited access to the host
computer, but actually prevented the host computer from accessing antivirus sites that could "cure" the host. 23 It is counter-intuitive that this
"technical measure" corresponds to ajust property interest. Just allocation
of property rights require additional considerations.
The first consideration is that the law should protect computer
resources. In the real world, it is not controversial that computers are
chattels.2 The legal consequences of physical interference with computers
(like kicking them or stealing them) are easily predictable. 25 Liability for
unauthorized use of computer resources, such as processing time and hard
disk space, has long been a feature of computer law. 26 (Indeed, there is

23. See
Sophos,
W32/Apology-B
at http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/
.analyses/w32apologyb.html (last viewed Mar. 11, 2001).
24. "The computer is a piece of tangible personal property." Ticketmaster, Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7954-HLH, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987, at *15 (C.D. Ca. Aug. 10,

2000).
25. See Section W. infra; see also IBM v. Comdisco, Inc., C.A. No. 91-C-07-199, 1991
Del. Super LEXIS 453 (Del. 1991).
26. See, e.g., State v. McGraw, 480 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind. 1985) (use of city computers by
city employee for outside business purposes that did not cause the computers to reach capacity and
therefore did not deprive the city of anything of value did not constitute theft but could constitute
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even a market for processing cycles that would otherwise go unused.) 27 In
the real world, it is usually clear who owns what computer. The
application of the cyberspace metaphor should not change the ownership
of a computer.
The second consideration is privacy. A salient definition of privacy is
the ability to control the flow of information about one's self and the
ability to make meaningful choices about when information is disclosed.
The metaphor of cyberspace is useful here because it accommodates
property rights, which in turn imply privacy interests. Privacy and the
proprietary right to exclude depend on each other in other contexts. The
solitary application 2s of the Third Amendment29 found that "privacy
interest[s] arise... out of the use and enjoyment of property" and that
privacy interests gave rise to Third Amendment property rights.30 When
illegal searches are suppressed because they violate "legitimate
expectations of privacy," Fourth Amendmenturisprudence has found that
those expectations can be based on property. 3'
In a medium that permits extremely low cost duplication and
transmission of information, the ability to control information is important.
This importance is reflected in the persistence of privacy as a theme in
legal and media commentary on the Internet.32 The protection of computer

trespass to chattels); Evans v.Commonwealth, 308 S.E.2d 126 (Va. 1983) (noting that VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-98.1 (1978) effectively reversed the result in Lund v. Virginia, 232 S.E.2d 745 (Va.
1977), which found that the use of processing time was not theft).
27. See ProcessTree, How It Worksathttp:l/www.processtree.comhow.asp (last viewed Nov.
19, 2000). Additionally, at least one American company is willing to provide "free" Internet service
in exchange for otherwise unused processor power. See Cryptome, Juno Apes Cops and NSSG in
Asymmetrical Padwad at http://cryptome.org/juno-puke2.htm (Feb. 3, 2001).
28. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2nd. Cir. 1982) characterized itself as the first nontrivial federal consideration of the Third Amendment and the sole case finding a violation of the
Third Amendment. See id., at 959 n. 1.
29. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any home, without consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be proscribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. Ill.
30. Engblom, 677 F.2d at 962 (finding Third Amendment violation when National Guard first
evicted striking state prison guards then stationed themselves in the guards' dormitories).
31. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
fourth amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law
or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the
main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others.. . and one who
owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.
Id., at 144.
32. There are at least 157 law review articles on Internet privacy and 867 articles which
mention that theme. Search of Lexis Combined Law Review Database, Lexis-Reed Elesevier (Nov.
19, 2000) (searches for articles containing "Internet" and "privacy" in the same in sentence in the
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resources and privacy interests in the real world should "translate" into the
protection of property interests in cyberspace. An individual Internetconnected computer provides a certain amount of space for data. That
computer's resources, like its memory and processing power, provide
space, or real property, in cyberspace. If an Internet-connected computer
can be seen as providing space, then data, or information, that resides on
that computer can be seen as movable property, or chattels. The protection
of privacy interests on the Internet (the right to exclude others from an
owner's data) is implicit in the protection of property interests in Internetconnected computers.
1. Laws Which Function like the Metaphor
Two federal laws provide models that closely resemble how the fences
in cyberspace metaphor might be applied. These laws reinforce measures
taken to protect the privacy of information or communication with civil
and criminal liability. In this sense, they recognize efforts to exclude other
and expectations that others will be excluded as "fences." These laws also
treat "fenced-off" information like property, by punishing efforts to
circumvent exclusive measures.
The Internet implicates individual's ability to control information flows
at several places. The user may create information flows autonomously but
unwillingly33 or unwittingly, others may take information from his
computer, and information sent to others can be taken in transit. American
privacy laws are an ad hoc collection of very narrowly drawn laws that
mainly address information autonomously disclosed.' One exception in
this regard is the Electronic Privacy Communications Act (ECPA).3 5
summary field and anywhere in text, respectively).
33. There is a difference between autonomous and willing disclosures. Autonomous
disclosures are the result of the discloser's intentional actions. To contrast, a person coerced into
disclosing financial data by the necessity of acquiring a bank account, driver's license or a
telephone number has done so autonomously, but might argue that he or she has not done so
willingly.
34. See, e.g., Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000) (limiting disclosure of information about
citizens by federal agencies); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
(2000) (limiting disclosure of information about students by educational institutions); Right to
Financial Privacy Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (2000) (limiting disclosure of information about
customers by depository institutions to federal law enforcement officials); Cable Communication
Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000) (limiting the disclosure of information about subscribers by
cable companies); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000) (limiting the disclosure
of information about video renters by video rental stores); Drivers Privacy Protection Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (2000) (limiting disclosure of information about drivers by state driver's
licensing agencies); Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2000)
(limiting collection and disclosure of information about children under 13 by website operators).
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 2701-09 (2000).
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ECPA governs electronic communications 36 that are not readily accessible
to the general public. Title I of ECPA criminalizes the interception of
wire or electronic communications and the use or disclosure of such
communications when the interception of such communications were
known to be in violation of ECPA. 3' Title I also criminalizes the use of
"devices" to intercept communications 39 and the manufacture, distribution,
possession or advertising of devices whose main commercial use is the
intercept wire or electronic communications. 4° ECPA provides persons
whose communications are intercepted in violation of ECPA a civil cause
of action. 4 ' Title H criminalizes unauthorized access (or access in excess
of authorization) of a facility where electronic communications are stored
as well as unauthorized disclosure of electronic communication.42 ECPA
rules for law enforcement exceptions for interception of electronic
communications and disclosure of stored information 43 are remarkably
complex but ultimately irrelevant to this discussion."
The Economic Espionage Act (the federal implementation of trade
secret law) governs the disclosure of information.45 Specifically, the EEA
provides penalties for the theft of trade secrets:4 "all kinds of...
information... if A) the owner takes reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and B) the information derives independent economic
value, actual and potential, from not being generally known, and not being
generally ascertainable through proper means, by the public...
The metaphor of fences in cyberspace would protect privacy in a
manner similar to the ECPA and the EEA. All three recognize efforts to

36. Electronic communications are defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectric or photooptical system." 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (12) (2000).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2) (g) (2000).
38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 (1) (a), (c), (d)(2000).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) (b) (2000).
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 2512 (2000).
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).
43. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511 (2), (3), 2513,2516-19,2522,2702 (b) (2), 2703-06,2709 (2000).
44. The Fifth Circuit has characterized the Wiretap Act as "famous (ifnot infamous) for its
lack of clarity." Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457,462 (5th Cir.
1994). The Ninth Circuit has stated that the Fifth Circuit "might have put the matter too mildly.

Indeed, the intersection of the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act is a complex, often
convoluted, area of the law." United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998). Jerry
Kang has described ECPA as "grossly complicated." Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in
Cyberspace Transaction, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1193, 1233 (1998).
45. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2000).

46. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-32 (2000).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (3) (2000).

NOTE

exclude others as the basis for rights to remedy. ECPA protects electronic
communications which are not available to the public. EEA protects
information that is valuable because it is unknown. ECPA reinforces the
property rights of electronic communication facilities owners and the
expectations of privacy for users of electronic communication systems. By
providing criminal and civil sanctions against unauthorized access to
private communication and information, ECPA provides users of
electronic communications an effective right of exclusion. ECPA has
already been used to protect the privacy of communications stored on a
web site in Konop v. HawaiianAirlines, Inc." Konop was involved with
a dispute over his union's concession to management and had encouraged
49
other employees to use of his web site to discuss alternate representation.
Access to the web site was limited by passwords and usernames issued to
employees not in management or involved in union representation who
agreed to abide by certain conditions (including not disclosing the web
site's contents).' ° The court found an ECPA violation when a manager
obtained a username and password from a pilot and perused the web site.51
C. Open Access
Again drawing on the metaphor, fences create enclosed areas. By
implication, fences create areas within which people are free to wander.
The gains from treating technical measures as if they were fences in the
real world would be lost if liability attached to interactions between
enclosed and unenclosed areas. The benefits gained from the notice
function that the fences served would be lost because the application of the
law would once again become unpredictable. Nor would the law benefit
from the reinforcement of technical measures with which it did not
coincide.
Harold Reed Smith also presented an open-system model of the
Internet that did not reference boundaries but referenced "the actions taken
in [c]yberspace-considering their consequences and apparent
motivations. ' 52 Smith recognized that the Internet functioned best by
sharing access to computing resources and facilitating communication
between users.5 3 Smith found that open-system would permit sharing of
computing resources when boundaries between networks were

48. 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001).
49. See id., at 1041.
50. See id.
51. See id, at 1046. Dicta suggests that anyone failing to conform the conditions
accompanying access would also have run afoul of ECPA. See id., at 1047.
52. See Harold Reeves Smith, supra note 14, at 766
53. See id
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"permeable."'M Smith's open-system model further informs the cyberspace
metaphor. There is precedent for adopting Smith's open-system model;
courts have previously presumed implied licenses based on social custom.
The Supreme Court presumed an implied license to use unenclosed land
from common customs prevailing at the time of the settlement of the
American West:
We are of opinion that there is an implied license, growing
out of the custom of nearly a hundred years, that the public
lands of the United States... shall be free to the people who
seek to use them where they are left open and unenclosed...
Of course the instances became numerous in which persons
purchasing land from the United States put only a small part
of it in cultivation, and permitted the balance to remain
unenclosed and in no way separated from the lands owned by
the United States. All the neighbors who had settled near one
of these prairies or on it, and all the people who had cattle
that they wished to graze upon the public lands, permitted
them to run at large over the whole region, fattening upon the
public lands of the United States, and upon the unenclosed
lands of the private individual, without let or hindrance....
Everybody used the open unenclosed country, which
produced nutritious grasses, as a public common on which
their horses, cattle, hogs and sheep could run and graze. It has
never been understood that in those regions and in this
country, in the progress of its settlement, the principle
prevailed that a man was bound to keep his cattle confined
within his own grounds, or else would be liable for their
trespasses upon the unenclosed grounds of his neighbors.
Such a principle was ill-adapted to the nature and condition
of the country at that time.55-

54. Computer time is a limited resource, and an operable computer that is unused
or underused is a wasted resource.. .. (tihe law... must recognize ... more
permeable system boundaries become, the more those who need to will cross
those boundaries and make use of those systems. Legal rules could, for example,
encourage users to more efficiently allocate computer time, shifting operations
from systems that are [overused] at certain hours to systems that are underused at
those times... the same argument applies to the use of computer memory. A
computer system with substantially more memory than its users require could be
used to store information for others... such an arrangement would facilitate
information distribution without any serious impairment to the owner of the
underused system.
Id., at 787
55. Buford v. Hurotz, 133 U.S. 320, 326-28 (1890); see also id., at 330; Kerwhaker v.
Cleveland, Colombus and CinncinnatiRail Rd. Co., 3 Ohio St. 173, 179 (1854).
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As implied licenses to used unenclosed lands promoted the settlement
of the West, a implied licenses to use computer resources and data stored
on computers presumed from an absence of preventative technical
measures promotes use of Internet. The article will return to comparing the
Internet to the unsettled American West when it considers the application
of the metaphor to specific laws.
D. Metaphors Found
In review, this article has explored four aspects of the cyberspace
fences metaphor. First, conceptualizing computers as embodying physical
space in cyberspace permits the law to adapt current rules about privacy
and computer security in a way that would mirror the function of property
rules in cyberspace. Secondly, the metaphor permits the law to posit
fences in cyberspace that then permits the law to define property rights in
cyberspace much more precisely. The third aspect is that property in
cyberspace must be based on property-like interests in the real world, such
as privacy or actual ownership of the computers and information stored
therein. Fences should only be built on one's own land. The final aspect
of the metaphor is a presumption of open access where no property rights
have been effectively asserted. The Internet can effectively be compared
the early days of the West. Without a presumption of free access to
resources that are not cordoned off by technical measures, many uses of
the Internet are thrown into legal indeterminacy. The law would be much
more invasive and unpredictable, and much less efficient.
With this expanded metaphor of cyberspace, the article can examine
information flows on the Internet and technical measures that protect
them. The next section will describe how cyberspace actually "looks." In
Section IV, the article will examine how laws would apply to these
information flows and will use the cyberspace metaphor to point out
shortcomings in our laws and advocate different language and different
applications.
III. INFORMATION FLOW ON THE INTERNET

A. Autonomous InformationFlows
The Internet is a single network using a common communication
protocol communication: the transmission control protocol/Internet
protocol (TCP/IP). Communicating across the Internet typically implies
a TCPLP connection, although there are exceptions. There are four
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different layers of communication within TCP/IP; the network interface
56
layer, the internet layer, the transport layer, and the application layer.
The network interface layer, or link layer, is where electronic signals
are sent and received over the wire. The electronic signals may be
packaged in order to achieve compatibility with the hardware.
The internet layer, or network layer, is where the Internet protocol
functions by routing packages of data, called packets. Packets consist of
data that are being sent to or from the computers and "packaging." The
packaging includes source and destination IP addresses. IP addresses are
the numeric designation of individual computers on the Internet. Packets
sent through the Internet are routed according to their IP address; they
perform substantially the same function as mail addresses. The other
important communication protocol used at this level is the Internet control
message protocol (ICMP.) ICMP is used for two important diagnostic
programs; ping and traceroute. Packets sent by ping are returned by
computers that are connected to the Internet. Ping is used to establish
whether particular IP addresses have computers associated with them and
whether those computers respond. Traceroute functions in a slightly more
complicated fashion, but its function is to return a list of every IP address
that is used to route data in between the source and destination IP address.
Traceroute is used to identify and diagnose networks.
The Transmission Control Protocol operates at the transportation layer,
negotiating the transfer of data between applications and the operating
system that controls the connection to the Internet. The TCP controls
socket generation. Sockets consist of ports and IP addresses. Port are
numeric designations that permit TCP to distinguish between data on the
basis of their application. Port numbers permit the operation of several
applications simultaneously. The transmission control protocol
reconstructs data passed from the internet layer into segments, while
breaking data passed from the application layer into segments. Segments
have a socket number and a sequence number. The sequence designation
permits TCP to ensure that all segments are received both at the local and
remote computers and that the segments are ordered correctly. A process
called a the three-way hand shake initiates data transfers in TCP. First, a
client computer sends out a packet with a "SYN" flag. The server responds
with a-SYN packet that has a initial sequence number (ISN) and an ACK
packet that acknowledges the clients request. The client computer
completes the process with an ACK packet that carries sequence

56. See e.g., TIMOTHY PARKER, TEACH YouRSELF TCP/IP IN 14 DAYS Page 1-50(2nd ed.
1996); Jason Yanowitz, Under the hood of the Internet: An overview of the TCP/IP Protocol Suite
at http://info.acm.org/crossroadslxrdsl-l/tcpjpy.html (modified Jan. 20, 2000).
57. See TIMOTHY PARKER, supra note 57, Id. at 39-99.
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information. 58 The other major protocol at the transportation layer is the
universal datagram protocol (UDP). The UDP does not attempt to
guarantee the reception of segments; it is used to broadcast messages to
computers on a local network in situations where reception is not critical.
The application layer is where the user actually interfaces with the
computer and the network. Data passes from the user's input into the
application, which passes it to the transportation layer.
Interaction on the Internet requires certain levels of disclosure. The
lowest common denominator of information flow on the internet is an [P
address. Traffic to and from a user's computer will probably be logged (if
not reproduced) by their local Internet access provider and the remote
computer.59 Public WHOIS databases can correlate [P addresses with the
internet service provider responsible for those IP addresses.6° The Internet
access provider can then correlate a particular [P address (and possibly the
time at which that particular IP address was assigned) with the login name
of a user. The login name can they be correlated with billing or other such
records that personally identify the user of a particular IP address. 6' While
Internet access providers do not generally disclose the identities of
particular IP addresses without legal prompting (that is, subpoenas), users'
privacy is dependent on the policies of their Internet access provider.62
Naturally, there are exceptions. Proxy servers will accept packets from
the local computer and substitute their own IP address as the source
address in the packet headings that are sent to the destination computer.
The result is that the remote computer will not log the user's actual IP
address, but the proxy's IP address. Nevertheless, the user's IP will
possibly be logged by the proxy.63 There are different kinds of proxies,

58. See Eric J. Sinrod & Williams P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A PracticalApproach to the
Application of FederalComputerCrimeLaws, 16 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 190 (2000).
59. See David Sobel, The Processthat "JohnDoe" is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge
to InternetAnonymity, 5 VA. J.L & TEcH. 3 17 n. 12 (1999), at http://www.jvolt.nettsymp2000/
johndoe.html (citing Kang, supra note 44, 1225, 1233).
60. WHOIS databases store information about who has the right to assign the individual IP
addresses within a particular range. See, e.g., IntemNIC, 'Registry Whois Database at
http://www.internic.orglwhois.html (last updated Oct. 26,2000). Internet access providers provide
this information to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority's appointed regional internet registrars
when the providers apply for IP ranges. There are three such registrars. In North America, South

America, the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa, the American Registry of Internet Numbers
assigns [P address ranges. See American Registry of Internet Numbers, About ARIN at
http://www.arin.net/arinintro.html (modified Sept. 15, 2000). This information includes points of
contact (POCs) for the registrants. See American Registry of Internet Numbers, ARIN: WHOIS at
http://www.arin.net/arinintro.html (modified Sept. 11, 2000).
61. See Sobel, supra note 59, at 7 n. 12
62. See generally, id.
63. See generally Kang, supra note 44, at 1242 n. 217.
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including those that occur accidentally and those designed for anonymity,
security or speed. Depending on the logging policy of the proxy, they can
offer complete privacy to users or merely create an additional step in
identifying a user.
Automation and graphical user interfaces (GUIs) increase user
accessibility to computers and increase productivity. Unfortunately,
automation and GUTs also mask the underlying mechanics of information
flow on the Internet. Because web browsing and other activities are made
transparent, users are unaware of information that is inadvertently exposed
through their use of applications. A prime example is browsing the world
wide web. Web browsers expose users to the risks of cookies, Java and
JavaScript and environmental checkers. Often, even the use of proxy
servers does not eliminate these risks. While a user autonomously chooses
to load a web page, the user may be unaware of how the browser is leaking
information about them.
Cookies are small text messages that are saved either as discrete files
or as lines in a single text file. They are used to identify recurring visitors
and can be used to track users as they move across the Internet identifying
a user every time he or she requests a web page that requires data from
whomever set the cookie. This feature of cookies gives web advertisers the
best vantage point to observe web users, because large advertisers provide
images in many web pages across the Internet. The most prominent
Internet-banner advertiser is most likely DoubleClick, Inc., a New Yorkbased corporation. DoubleClick claims that its patented DART technology
provides real-time profiling of users demographically identified by
cookies.
In December 1998, [DoubleClick] received over 5.3 billion
requests for the delivery of ads (impressions) generated by an
aggregate of approximately 6,400 web sites of 570 Web
publishers... According to Media Metrix, 45.8% of Internet
users in the United States visited Web sites within the
DoubleClick Network during the same month."
DoubleClick's activities generated a consolidated lawsuit alleging that
"DoubleClick Inc. improperly used or monitored confidential information
of computer users in delivering advertisements on the Internet." 65 The
federal claims of the lawsuit were dismissed on summary judgement in

64. Securities Exchange Commission, DoubleClick, Inv. 1998 10-K Form at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1049480/0001047469-99-008506.txt (Mar. 4, 1999).
65. In Re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, No. 1352, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11148
(J.M.P.L. Jul. 7 31, 2000).
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March, 2001.66
Java is a computer language written by Sun Computing. Miniapplications (applets) written in Java are stored on the remote web page
and are run when browsers encounter the appropriate "tag" in the source
code of a web page. Browsers download complied Java applications and
execute them.67 JavaScript is a series of extensions to the HTML language
designed by the Netscape Corporation and implemented by most modem
browsers. It is an interpreted language designed to control the browser (as
known as a scripting language, meaning that remote web server hosts the
source code and the source code is compiled by the client).6 Both Java
and JavaScript have a series of security issues 69 including permitting the
discovery of a user's IP despite a proxy,70 stealing files from a client
sensitive information is revealed, 7'
computer and monitoring a user until
72
and the execution of arbitrary code.
Browsers also reveal environmental variables in the header fields of the
HTMvL language. Information revealed in environmental variables
includes the user's original IP address, his browser version and operating
system."
Users can also inadvertently expose their IP address by opening
documents with images supplied by embedded URLs. If a user is
connected to the Internet, Microsoft Word 74 and email programs capable
of displaying HTML will load the images from remote sites as if they were
web browsers.75 Indeed, documents with unique URLs could be prepared
to track the viewing of a document across the Internet. Indeed, images
66. See In re DoubleClickInc. PrivacyLitigation,No. 00 Civ. 0641 (NRB), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3498 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2001).
67. See Lincoln Stein, WWW Security FAQ: Client Side Security at
http://www.span.orgldoclFAQs/ cgi/wwwsf7.html (modified Sept. 13, 1999).
68. See id.
Hostile Applets at
McGraw
& Ed Felten,
69. See id; Gary
http://www.cigital.conijavasecurity/applets.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2000); Ed Kubatitis, WWW
Browser Security & Privacy Flaws at http://www/ews.uiuc.edu/-ejklbrowser-security.html

(modified Jan. 11, 1999).
Not

70. See PrivacyTimes.com,

So Anonymous

at http://www.privacytimes.com/

NewWebstories/anon_priv_l l_16.htm (Nov. 4, 1999).
71. See David Brumley, The Dangers of JavaScript at http://www.stanford.edu/
-dbrumley/Me/javascript.htm (Jan. 24, 1999).
72. See Gregori Guninski, Internet Explorer security at http://www.guninski.com/
browsers.html (Nov. 23, 2000).
73. See Proxys -4- All, Environmental Variablesathttp://proxys4aU.cgi.netenv.shtml (last
viewed Nov. 25, 2000).
74. See

Privacy

Foundation,

Document Based Web

Bugs Privacy Advisory at

http://www.privacyfoundation.orgladvisories/advWordBug.html (Aug. 30, 2000).
75. See

Steve

Silberman,

Is

Web-Based Email Bad for Your

htttp://www.wired.comnews/culture/0,1284,10555,10.html (Feb. 26, 1998).

Anonymity?

at
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consisting of a single pixel can be embedded in documents so that the
document users would not know that they were loading images at all.
Microsoft Word is also capable of writing and sending cookies that
Microsoft Explorer keeps on a user's computer.76 This could expand the
potential threat to privacy.
B. Exogenous Information Flows
A connection to the Internet can reveal substantial information about
a computer at the direction of a remote user. Pinging an IP addresses will
reveal if that IP address is connected to the Internet and responsive.
Although ascertaining the presence of computers at an IP addresses is
necessary for the function of the Internet and may seem uncontroversial,
many system administrators react negatively to systematic pinging by
remote networks." Other activity is even more invasive. Each platform
and operating system has a unique "fingerprint" on the Internet, which can
be found be sending a series of specially crafted IPpackets to a computer
and comparing the responses (or lack thereof) to profiles of known
operating system/platform.78 Probably the best implementation of
operating system/platform TCP/IP-based identification is nmap. 79 Nmap
is also a port scanner.80 Packets can also be sent to different ports to check
if they are open (if applications are receiving data on those ports.) This
technique is called a port scan; it also can be used to predict whether
particular applications are running on a computer (although applications
can usually be made to use arbitrary port numbers.) 81 Responsive
applications have further implications. Some applications display a brief
text message, or a banner, that announces the name and version of the
application. 82 Collecting this information systematically called banner
grabbing. This is significant because certain applications can only be run
on particular operating systems. Finally, some applications will disclose
the operating system at the prompting of unauthenticated users. 83
76. See Privacy Foundation, Document Based Web Bugs PrivacyAdvisory, supra note 75.
77. See Kevin Poulsen, Scanning the Worldat http:lwww.securityfocus.comlnews/56 (July
7,2000) (describing the "troubled" and "angry" reaction ofsystem administrators all over the world
to the actions of Quova, a California start-up that pinged every assigned, non-governmental IP
address this year).
78. See Fydor, Remote OS Detection via TCP/IP Fingerprinting at
http://www.insecure.org/nmap/nmap-fingerprinting-article.html (modified Apr. 10, 1999).
79. See Fydor,Nmap at http://www.insecure.org/nmap/index.htm (modified Oct. 30,2000).
80. See id.
81. Rik Farrow, System FingerprintingWith Nmap at http://www.networkmagazine.com/
article/NMG20001102S0005/1 (Nov. 6, 2000).
82. See Fydor, supra note 79.
83. See id.
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Another class of disclosure occurs when applications initiate obscured
information flows without the user's initiation. The most invasive are
trojan horses and remote administration tools. After a user unwittingly
executes these programs, they permit a remote trojan user to control the
user's computer. The remote trojan user's access to information on the
computer is coextensive with the user's. The most prominent examples of
this kind of application are Back Orifice and Back Orifice 2000.
The legitimacy of these programs exists on a continuum. Back
Orifice's publisher's claims that it functions as a free, open source
replacement to commercial remote administration programs with better
encryption. Although those claims are probably best viewed as sophistry,
they are perfectly true. 5 The publishers of NetBus have successfully
legitimized their product to the point ,that anti-virus programs will no
longer prevent the installation of NetBus.86 And the publishers of Back
Orifice validly point out that accepted commercial remote administration
tools will perform silent and remote installations. 7
Applications besides remote administration tools collect information
for their publishers. These applications have been collectively referred to
as "spyware." The most legally prominent of these applications is
RealNetwork's RealAudio. In a class action lawsuit against RealNetworks,
the plaintiffs alleged "trespass to privacy and property, claiming
RealNetworks software products secretly allowed RealNetworks to access
and intercept users' electronic communications without their knowledge
or consent. 8 8 The essence of the allegations was that RealAudio made
record of the files that users downloaded and relayed this information to
RealNetworks without giving any indication to the users of what was
happening. The class action suit has been stayed by enforcement of the
mandatory arbitration clause in the End User License Agreement included
in every copy of relevant software.8 9 A later RealNetworks application,

84. See Sinrod & Williams, supra note 58, at 223-24.
85. See Back Orifice 2000, BO2k Comparison at http://www.bo2k.com/comparison.html
(July 6, 1999); see also Back Orifice 2000, A Note on Product Legitimacy and Security at

http://www.bo2k.com/legitimacy.html (July 10, 2000).
86. See Kevin Poulsen, NetBus gains Legitimacy at http://www.securityfocus.con/news/81
(Sept. 7, 2000)
87. See Back Orifice 2000, A Note on Product Legitimacy and Security, supra note 86

(describing Carbon Copy 32); Anti-AV, Trojan Chartat http://www.antiav.com/chart.html (Sept.
9, 2000) (cross-referencing commercial and non-commercial remote administration tools, their
price, and their information collection capabilities).
88. See In Re RealNetworks Privacy Litigation,No. 00 C 1366,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584
(N.D. 11. May 11, 2000).
89. See In Re RealNetworks Privacy Litigation, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584.
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Download Demon, had a similar function but disclosed it in the EULA. 9°
Another class action lawsuit against Amazon.com its subsidiary, Alexa,
alleged violations of ECPA has survived attempts to prevent the lawsuit
from going forward as class action. 9 The lawsuit's core allegations were
that Alexa's plug-in software, which provided additional information
about website providers, leaked browser' habits back to Alexa without
notice and in violation of the privacy policies of Amazon.com and Alexa.
The Federal Trade Commission has reportedly initiated an investigation. 92
Similar allegations have been made about the software that
accompanies CueCat, a bar code scanner. CueCat's software attached
unique identifying numbers to barcode queries that were sent to the
databases of CueCat's manufacturer and cross-referenced with extensive
profiles filled out by users in order to activate the software.9 3 This was
done without informing users.94 Other notorious examples include Arthur's
Reading Race, a children's educational game by Mattel, 95 Netscape's AOL
Smart Download and Qualcomm's free version of Eudora.T In fact,
hundreds of applications use technology that surreptiously discloses user
information."
C. Flowsfrom Communication Between Computers
Data sent to another computer on the Internet must typically pass
through networks and computer systems that are not under the control of
the originator or the recipient. While the data is out of the control of
originator and recipient, owners of intermediate computers could copy all
their traffic rather than simply forwarding it.
Increasingly, users operate behind firewalls that monitor and control
their on-line behavior. 98 A survey conducted by the American

90. See
Privacy
Forum Archive,
Volume
09,
Issue 15
at
http:llwww.vortex.comlprivacy/priv.09.15 (May 18, 2000).
91. See Supnick v. Amazoncom, No. COO-0221P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7073 (W.D. Wa.
May 19,2000).
92. See Keith Perine, FTC Investigates Amazon's Alexa at http://www.thestandard.
comlarticleldisplay/0, 1151,9599,00.html (Feb. 8, 2000).
93. See Privacy Foundation, :CueCat Bar Code Reader Privacy Advisory at http:llwww.
privacyfoundation.org/advisoriesladvCueCatl .html (Sept. 22, 2000).
94. See Barbara Darrow, :CueCat Pounces On Privacy at http://www.techweb.com/
wire/storyTWB20000922S003 (Sept. 22, 2000).
95. See Simson Garfinkel, Software that can spy on you at http://www.salon.com/tech/
col/garf/2000/06/15/brodcast (Jun. 16, 2000).
96. See Doug Bedell, Getting Inside Your Mind at http://www.dallasnews.comltechnology/
174043.spyware_21per..html (Sept. 21, 2000).
97. See id.
98. See Privacy International, Privacy& Human Rights 2000: Workplace Privacy:Internet
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Management Association revealed that 27%of employers store and review
users email and 21.4% store and review files users have transmitted in
1999 (up from 20.2% and 19.6% respectively in 1998.) 99 There are a
multiple of widely used commercial software products that permit
corporate firewall managers to control and monitor employee's Internet
activities. 00
Governments also monitors network traffic in transit. Many
government surveillance systems are installed by the government at the
access provider's facilities or installed by the access provider under
government order. The American, British and Russian surveillance
systems are the most publicized. The U.S. Federal government
implemented "Carnivore," a system designed to selectively monitor the
activities of an individual user (and therefore compliant with ECPA).' 0 '
The United Kingdom has passed the Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act of 2000 (RIP), which permits the Secretary of State to impose "such
obligations as it appears to him [or her] reasonable to impose for the
purpose of securing that it is and remains practicable for requirements to
provide assistance in relation to interception warrants to be imposed and
compiled with." 02 The end result of RIP is a legal regime authorizing the
UK government to install "black boxes" to Internet access providers "that
can be switched on under warrant to pipe data to a unit in the building of
M15, Britain's internal intelligence service."103 The Russian Federation's
Federal Security Service (FSB) promulgated an order on the System of
Operational Research Actions (SORM-2) which required Internet access
providers to install systems that could monitor their users." The Russian

and E-mail Usage Boxes at http://www.privacy.org/pi/survey/phr200O/threats.html#Headingl8
(2000) (describing employer Internet surveillance).
99. See American Managment Association, Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance at
http:llwww.amanet.orglresearchlmonitlmonfrml .htm (1999).
100. See
WebSense,
The
Corporate ElM
Vendor Market at
http://www.websense.com/company/eim.-market.pdf (Fall 2000).
101. Sea U.S. Department of Justice, IndependentTechnicalReview of the Carnivore System:
Draft Report athttp://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carnivore-drafl.pdf(Nov. 17,2000); see
also Cryptome, Draft Report : Independent Technical Review of the Carnivore System at

http://cryptome.org/camivore-rev.htm (modified Nov. 23, 2000). The Draft Report provides
remarkable detail on a secret monitoring system and probably the best look at what government
Internet monitoring systems look like.
102. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 1 (12) (Eng.) available at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uktacts/acts200020000023.htm (2000).
103. Cryptome, U.K. Internet Tapping Bill Stays Intact; Amended Text Addresses Privacy

Issues athttp://cryptome.org/rip-intacthtm (modified July 17,2000). To a large extent, RIP appears
to resemble ECPA.
104. See Privacy International, Privacy & Human Rights 2000: Internet Surveillance and
Black Boxes at http://www.privacy.org/pi/survey/phr2000/threats.html#Heading9 (2000).
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Supreme Court recently ruled that the operation of SORM required
warrants, evidently overturning some of the FSB's order.' °5
D. Referencing the Facts
In the next Section's discussion of how the metaphor of cyberspace
could permit the law to provide predictable and just outcomes, this article
will reference some of the information flows previously mentioned in this
Section. This Section provides a basis for discussing the current state of
the Internet. Rooted in language developed for previously discussed
technology, the law is able to adapt to the current state of the Internet only
roughly. The final Section will consider the remaining information flows
to ensure the robustness of the metaphor.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE METAPHOR

This section makes three applications of the cyberspace metaphor. The
metaphor provides the most practical utility in the context of trespass to
chattels actions against unauthorized use of network resources. Endorsing
the metaphor would permit the law to convert actions for trespass to
chattels to actions for trespass on real property. Converting trespass to
chattels actions to trespass on real property solves nagging damages issues
that complicate straightforward application of the law to stop spammers
and others from abusing network resources.
Second, the cyberspace metaphor provides a critical perspective on
state and federal computer fraud laws. The word "access" has been
adopted by most legislatures, but courts have sometimes struggled to fix
boundary of liability at "access." Furthermore, the cyberspace metaphor
can assign privacy and property right on the modem Internet much better
than current computer fraud laws. "Access" terminology confounds the
consistent, practical and efficient application of current laws to modem
information flows.
Finally, the cyberspace metaphor adds to the debate over the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, which reinforces "trusted systems." Although
it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss on which side of the debate
the public good lies, the metaphor permits a new examination of the issues
involved.

105. See Cryptome, Russian Carnivore to Shut Down? at httpJ/www.cryptome.orgrusormshut.htm (Sept. 26, 2000).
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A. Trespass to Chattels and Strong Fences
1. Background
State v. McGraw' 6 first recognized that misappropriation of computer
resources could constitute trespass against chattels. 7 In overturning a
conviction for theft, McGraw found that the storage of data for an
employee's outside business was more like trespass against chattels. 1°8
The first actual application of the trespass to chattels tort to computers
did not occur on the Internet but over a phone line. In Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v.
Bezenek,'° the defendant's underaged sons made long distance phone calls
through the unauthorized use of Thrifty-Tel's long-distance telephone
service.110 Long-distance phone calls could be made without charge
through the use of Thrifty-Tel's telephone service with an access code and
an authorization code.111 With an access code provided by a friend,
Bezenek's sons used a computer and a modem to automate a random
search for authorization codes. 2 Thrifty-Tel filed suit and the court
acknowledged the defendant's liability for trespass to chattels." 3 Trespass
to chattels requires tangible interference with the property. The court was
willing to find that the defendant's repeated phone calls constituted
tangible interference, but it required an extension of the law.
The modem rule recognizes an indirect touching or entry:
e.g., dust particles from a cement plant that migrate onto
another's real and personal property may give rise to trespass.
... But the requirement of a tangible has been relaxed almost
to the point of being discarded. Thus some courts have held
that microscopic particles... or smoke... may give rise to
trespass. And the California Supreme Court has intimated
migrating particles (e.g., sound waves) may result in a
trespass, provided they do not simply impede an owner's use
or enjoyment of property, but cause damage ... . In our view,

106. 480 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. 1985).
107. See id. at 554. "A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally: a)
dispossessing another of the chattel, or b) using or intermeddling with a chattel of in the possession
of another." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(1965).
108. See id.
109. 46 Cal.App.4th 1559 (1996).
110. See id., at 1563.

111. See id
112. Seeid.,at1564.
113. Seeid.,at 1566.
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the electronic signals generated by the Bezenek boys'
activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass
cause of action." 4
As Professor Dan Burk notes, however, the actions cited by Thrifty-Tel
were actions for trespass to lands."' Burk objects that trespass to chattels
does not entail "the interest of inviolability that attends trespass to lands,"
and that even within "the context of real property, impinging ephemeral
substances .. .or intangibles . ..typically have been addressed by
doctrines of nuisances" 6 rather than doctrines of trespass.1 . 7 Burk also
argues that trespass to chattels is a deficient legal theory in this context
because it requires that some actual harm or impairment must be shown;
either the owner is dispossessed of his property, the quality or condition
of the property is impaired, the owner is deprived of the use of the
property for a substantial time or some bodily harm is caused. Is
2. Adoption and Development
Despite these flaws, courts have widely adopted the trespass to chattels
theory in lawsuits by email providers against spammers."' Courts found

114. Id. at 1567 n. 6 (citing Ream v. Keen, 838 P.2d 1073 (Or. 1992) (finding trespass to
chattels from smoke); Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 709 P.2d 782 (Wa. 1985)
(finding trespass to chattels from microscopic particles); Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 32 Cal.3d
229 (1982) (finding trespass to chattels from dust and sound waves); Roberts v. Permanente Corp.,
10 Cal.Rptr. 519 (1961) (finding trespass to chattels from dust and sound )).
115. See Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27

(2000).
116. Nuisance is defined as "that activity which arises from unreasonable, unwarranted or
unlawful use by a person of his own property... [or] that which annoys and disturbs one in
possession of his property, rendering its ordinary use or occupation physically uncomfortable to
him." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1065 (6th ed. 1990).
117. Burk, supra note 115, at 33-34.
The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similiar
interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an action for
nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel.... therefore, one
who intentionally intermeddles with another's' chattel is subject to liability only
if his intermeddling is harmful to the possessor's materially valuable interest in
the physical condition, quality or value of the chattel . .. sufficient legal
protection of the possessor's interest in the mere inviolability of his chattel is
afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his possession against
even harmless interference.
Restatement (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218, cmt.e (1965).
118. See id., at 34; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965).
119. See, e.g., America Online v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F.Supp.2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998); America
Online v. IMS, Inc., 24 F.Supp.2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, No.
C98-20064 JW,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 16,1998); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber
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two common, relevant elements in these cases; first, by consuming system
resources, spain impaired the condition of the email servers (namely, by
consuming computer resources and generating complaints from
subscribers) and, second, defendants received some sort of notice that their
use was unauthorized (either explicit written notice or notice in a
Acceptable Use Policy.)" ° In CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,Inc.,
the defendants raised the issue of implied consent.12 ' The court
acknowledged that "there [was] at least a tacit invitation for anyone on the
Internet to utilize [CompuServe's] computer equipment to send e-mail to
its subscribers" because of the utility CompuServe derived from having its
subscribers receive email.122 The court found the defendants' claims that
this invitation could not be revoked (and therefore neither could the
implicit consent) "erroneous under Ohio law."' 23 This line of cases never
found that the spam caused the computer to actually reach maximum
capacity, possibly because impairment could always be found in
subscriber complaints. It was therefore not necessary to turn to computer
resource consumption to find impairment.
The trespass to chattels theory has spread to other contexts on the
Internet. In eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.,"' the court found that the
automated retrieval of eBay's web pages and consequent indexing of eBay
auctions by a Bidder's Edge program constituted trespass to chattels.'
eBay, Inc. explicitly addressed the impact of unauthorized consumption of
computer resources where the consumption did not cause the computer to
reach maximum capacity.'2 The court's findings seem to impute the
Promotions,Inc, 962 F.Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
120. America Online v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F.Supp.2d 444, at 451-52; America Online v. IMS,
Inc., 24 F.Supp.2d at 550, HotmailCorp. v. Van$ Money Pie, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729, at *16,
CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,Inc, 962 F.Supp. at 1023.
121. See CompuServe, at 1023-24.
122. Id.
123. Id., at 1024.
124. 100 F.Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Ca. 2000).
125. See id., at 1069-72.
126. See id., at 1071. But see Ticketmaster, Corp.v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV99-7954-HLH,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Ca. Aug. 10, 2000) (declining to impose a preliminary
injunction, holding instead that a trespass to chattels claim against Tickets.com for the unauthorized
indexing of Ticketmaster's web site was preempted by federal copyright law).
It must be said that the trespass question presented and decided in eBay bore no
resemblance to the trespass question considered by this court on the motion to
dismiss last March [because different legal theories were presented].... [l]f
taking the information from a publically [sic] available computer was state law
trespass, it fell afoul of the preemption aspects of the Copyright Act .... It is
noted that the harm to [eBay's] equipment foreseen was to its intended function,
not the physical characteristics of the computer. A basic element of trespass to
chattels must be physical harm to the chattel (not shown here) or some obstruction
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inviolability of chattels by conflating the absence of a right for Bidder's
Edge to use eBay's property with eBay's legal right to exclude Bidder's
Edge. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc. used the same standard of harm
to impose liability for trespass to chattels on Verio, where Verio accessed
Register.com's public WHOIS database for marketing purposes. 128
3. A Trespass Too Far?
Burk makes two reductio ad absurdum arguments against the
application of trespass against chattels. First, he raises the possibility of
extending the trespass to chattels theory to other contexts.
One wonders where the limits of such 'trespass by electrons'
might lie. If one is willing to base the physical contact
requirement of trespass upon the receipt of electrons, then
whole new vistas of electronic trespass are opened to our
view. Unwanted telephone callers would seem to be engaging
in trespass to chattels; the telephone call sends signals to the
instrument of the recipient. So, too,29 with fax machines that
receive unwelcome transmissions.
This result is not so absurd, however. Federal law already gives
telephone and fax owners certain private rights of action against certain
unsolicited commercial callers.' 3° Some of those prohibitions protect the
same interests at stake in these cases; interlopers should not be able to
impair the value or impose extra costs on the owner of communications
equipment. Secondly, Burk argues that the computers cannot legally be
considered to be harmed if they function as they were designed to do (that

of its basic function (in the court's opinion not sufficiently shown here).
Id. at *14-15, 16-17.
127. [I]t is undisputed that eBay's server and its capacity are personal property, and
that BE's searches use a portion of this property. Even if, as BE argues, its
computer searches use only a small amount of eBay's computer system capacity,
BE has nonetheless deprived eBay of the ability to use that portion of its personal
property for its own purposes. The law recognizes no such right to use another's
property.
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.. at 1071.
128. "A trespasser is liable when the trespass diminishes the condition, quality, or value of
personal property. The quality or value of personal property may be diminished even though it is
not physically damaged by defendant's conduct." Register.comr Inc. v. Verioo Inc., 126 F. Supp.
238, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting eBay, Inc., at 1071).
129. Burk, supranote 115, at 34.
130. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000) (prohibiting all unsolicited advertisements to a fax, cell
phone, pager, or other telecommunication device where receiver pays for the call and prohibiting
certain unsolicited telephone solicitations, including automated telephone dialing systems).
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is, email servers are not harmed by sending email.) 13 1 This argument does
not recognize the rights of owners that underlie the legal theory of trespass
to chattels. A similar argument could be made about joyriding in a car.
The joyrider's use of the car causes no hann to the car, but is
unauthorized. Nevertheless, it is not controversial that depriving the car's
owner the use of the car is a valid basis for liability, no matter that no
harm was caused to the car.
But Burk's last policy argument presents a much more potent objection
32
to the theory of trespass to chattels. Burk cites Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,'
where Intel sued a former employee who sent email critical of Intel to Intel
employees through Intel's own email servers. The court found that a
connection to the Internet did not transform the email servers from private
property to a "public forum," where Hamidi would be immune from legal
intervention by the property owner. Hence, the court rejected Hamidi's
First Amendment defenses. Burk argues that the application of the theory
trespass to chattels to the Internet could have severe effects on the function
of the Internet as a whole. 133 Hamidistands as an example of how trespass
to chattels can be used as an arbitrary barrier on the Internet. Burk argues
that exercise of property rights in an environment like the Internet
represents a threat to the functionality of the system as a whole.
[Piroperization in a networked environment encourages the
holder of the exclusive right to attempt to free-ride upon the
external benefits of the network, while at-will avoiding
contribution of such benefits to others. For example, in the
Hamidi case, Intel apparently wished to enjoy the advantages
of e-mail access to the Internet from its system, which was
the reason it connected its machinery physically to the
network. At the same time, it hoped to make its system
unavailable to Hamidi, at least for the transmission of content
that the company found objectionable .... Intel or eBay may
hope to avoid the local burden of networking by legal
exclusion, but this eventually will result in suppression of the
positive externalities of networking .... If propertization via
trespass imposes costs in excess of the costs imposed by
131. See Burk, supra note 115, at36.

132. No. 98 AS05067, 1999 WL 450944 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999).
133. mhe essential elements of ContpuServe trespass are readily found in almost any
online activity; the cause of action might better be named "using a networked
computer." The Internet operates by allowing users to exchange electrons,
consume processing cycles, and occupy disc space on its constituent machines.
...[A]II that any user needs to fulfill the elements of trespass is to withdraw
consent for some real or imagined offense.
Burk, supra note 115, at 48.
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spain, it is difficult to justify recognition of trespass claims:
they may do more harm to the digital commons than do the
unauthorized uses they are designed to prevent.' 34
Users would need to seek the permission of each individual computer
owner their traffic passed over if trespass to chattels was taken to its
extreme. Burk's argument is potent because it addresses how the exercise
of property rights could effectively destroy the public nature of the
Internet. Nevertheless, two answers to it can be raised.
First, computer owners are capable of employing technical measures
to prevent many unauthorized activities that might otherwise contribute to
the commons of the Internet. Eliminating the tort of trespass to chattels
from the law applicable to the Internet would not save the Internet
commons from privatization. Moreover, legal rules prohibiting such
technical measures seem like a dramatic curtailment of property rights.
Second, Burk's economic analysis is specific to spare. Other activities
with different economic effects need to be regulated. Application of the
trespass to chattels theory might be inefficient with respect to spare but
efficient with respect to hacking, spyware or cookie placement. Moreover,
property rights are based in personal autonomy, not economic efficiency;
we cannot include spam under trespass to chattels and then exclude
Hamidi's messages, without implicating the coherence of the law. As
previously argued, the incoherence and unpredictability of the law have
their own economic costs. Ultimately, inconsistent legal rules are more
inefficient than permitting propertization of the Internet when technical
measures can impose the same loss of open access in any event.
4. Application of the Metaphor: the Importance of Fences
As a strict matter of law, Burk's contention that trespass to chattels
does not technically cover spamn or unauthorized indexing may be
correct.' 35 (I equivocate because the courts have established all the
elements of trespass to chattels to their own satisfaction and the courts'
definition is self-reinforcing in a way Burk's analysis is not.) Indeed,
Susan Ballantine contends that courts should analogize and use trespass on
lands precisely because trespass to chattels is inadequate for the
situation. 36 Using the cyberspace metaphor provides an easy exit to this
dilemma. If we envision email servers as a physical space, then spam is

134. Id. at 51-52, 53.

135. In particular, Ticketmaster, Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987,
cited in footnote 126 above, supports Burk's position.
136. See Susan M. Ballantine, ComputerNetwork Trespasses: Solving New Problems with Old

Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE L REV. 209, 249-51 (2000).
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easily perceived as a nuisance. The cyberspace metaphor transforms
trespass to chattels to trespass on real property.
The application of the metaphor of fences in cyberspace requires us to
examine he plaintiff's technical measures to prevent the defendants from
consuming their computer resources. The rule of fences holds that the law
will not fix liability unless the defendant circumvents reasonable technical
measures implemented by the plaintiff. In fact, most of the spam cases
mention defendants' measures to conceal the origin of their messages.
CompuServe discussed the legal right of chattel owners to take such
measures.' Bidder's Edge, Inc. discussed the extensive measures eBay
took to prevent Bidder's Edge indexing eBay.'38 The only case previously
cited which does not discuss technical measures to prevent defendants'
actions is Hotmail Corp. v. Vans Money Pie, where the defendants used
accounts at the plaintiff's free email service to send spam."3 9 Given that
Hotmail offered free email accounts to the general public, the costs of
screening may have been unreasonable. It may be that there were no
possible technical measures to be taken in Van$ Money Pie. In these cases,
the "fences in cyberspace" analysis looks to see whether reasonable
technical measures were available and whether the technical measures
taken were reasonable.
The benefits of the analysis associated with the application of the
metaphor are threefold. First, the metaphor eliminates the technical
problem in the law described by Burk and Ballantine. Second, the
metaphor promotes technical solutions. Consider that if the technical
measures taken in the above cases were found to be inadequate, more
effective technical measures would have to be used. Technical measures
are preferable to judicial action: the CompuServe court noted that "the
implementation of technological means of self-help, to the extent that
reasonable measures are effective, is particularly appropriate in this type
of situation and should be exhausted before legal action is proper.,,,,o
Users would benefit more from technical measures against spam that
worked universally than from a legal remedy that applied to a limited set
of defendants and whose enforceability was not reliable. Finally, fences
promote free space and open access on the Internet. Burk's root concern
137. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc, 962 F.Supp. 1015, 1023.
138. [after licensing negotiations fell through, bidder's edge began to index ebay.] as
a result, ebay attempted to block be from accessing the ebay site; by the end of
november, 1999, ebay had blocked a total of 169 ip addresses it believed be was
using to query ebay's system. Be elected to continue crawling ebay's site by using
proxy servers to evade ebay's ip blocks.
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F.Supp. 2d at 1062-63.
139. Hotmail Corp. v. VanS Money Pie, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729.
140. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, nc,962 F.Supp. 1015, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
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is the erosion of common land in cyberspace. Under the cyberspace fences
metaphor, computer owners who do not choose to erect fences have no
basis to assign liability to users who consume their property. While the
law should not prevent the erection of fences on private land, it can
assume that whatever is not fenced off is free to use. The assumption
behind open access resembles the legal rule articulated in Buford v.
Hurotz,' which promoted free use of unenclosed portions of the Western
range because such use benefited agriculture, the economy and ultimately,
society. "
B. ComputerFraud Access and Nmap
1. Access as the Threshold of Liability
Most American jurisdictions have computer crime laws which include
prohibitions on unauthorized access. Seven states are exceptions. Georgia,
43
Montana and Viriginia criminalize unauthorized use of a computer.'
Minnesota criminalizes the "penetration" of a computer or computer
system.144 Wisconsin criminalizes the access of data, computer programs
and documentation, but requires that computer equipment itself by
modified, damaged or destroyed. 45 (Section IV.B.2 discusses the
remaining states, New York and Massachusetts, separately.) Of the
remaining forty-three states, only Alaska, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and West Virginia require some other
element beyond unauthorized access and mens rea (typically including
modification or destruction of data or fraud.) 4 Thirty-seven other states
require only access and mens rea.147 As a threshold for criminal liability,

141. 133 U.S. 320 (1890); see supra note 55.
142. See supra note 55.
143. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-93 (a), (b) (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-311 (a)
(1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-152.3, 18.2-152.4 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999).
144. See MINN. STAT. § 609.891 (1998).
145. See Wis. STAT. § 943.70 (West 1996).
146. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.740 (Michie 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:73.5 (West
1997); MIci. COMP. LAWS §§ 752.794,752.795 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. §
97-45-2 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE §
61-3C-5 (2000). Mens rea means "a guilty mind [or] . . . criminal intent." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 985.
147. See ALA. CODE § 13A-8-102 (a) (1994); ARrZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2316 (A) (8) (West 1989
& Supp. 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-104 (a) (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (c) (7)

(Deering 1998 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-251 (b) (1994 & Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 932 (1995 & Supp.
2000); FLA. STAT. ch. 815.06 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-892 (1) (Michie 1999); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-2202 (1997); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/16D-3 (West 1998); IND. CODE § 35-43-2-3 (1998);
IOWA CODE § 716A.2 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755 (1995 & Supp. 1997); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 434.850 (Michie 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 432 (West Supp. 2000); MD.
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"access" proves to be a tremendously porous border. Statutory definitions
of access are remarkably homogeneous and quite broad. The table below
shows how twenty one states use essentially three definitions for access.
POPULAR STATE DEFINITIONS OF ACCESS
Idaho, Missouri,
Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Florida,
Nebraska, New
Indiana,
Kentucky,
Connecticut,
Jersey and Vermont
North Dakota, Ohio,
Delaware, Iowa,
statutes.c
Oregon, Texas and
Kansas, and New
_
Wyoming statutes.
Hampshire statutes!
"to instruct,
"to approach, instruct,
"to instruct,
communicate with,
communicate with,
communicate with,
store data in,
store data in, retrieve
store data in, or
retrieve data from or
or
otherwise
data
from
a
data
from
retrieve
otherwise make use
computer, computer make use of any
of any resources of a
resources of a
system or computer
computer, computer
computer, computer
network"
system, or computer
system or computer
network"
network"
ALA. CODE § 13A-8-101 (11) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-102 (a) (1) (Michie 1997);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-250 (1) (1994 & Supp. 1999); DEL CODE ANN. Tit. 11, § 931 (1)
(1995 & Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 716A.1 (1) (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755 (a)
(1) (1995 & Supp. 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:16 (1) (1996).
b. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-2310 (E) (1) (West 1989 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.03
(10) (1996);KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.840 (Michie 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-2-3
(1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01 (3) (a) (1997); OH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.01 (T)
(Banks-Baldwin 1997 & Supp. 1999) (the definition for "gain access"); OR. REV. STAT. §
164.377(1) (a) (Supp. 1998); TEX. PENALCODE ANN. § 33.01 (1) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999);
a.

WYO. STAT. ANN. 6-3-501 (Michie 1999).

c.

IDAHO CODE § 18-2201 (1) (1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.093 (1) (West 1999); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-1343(1) (Michie 1995) ("to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data
from or otherwise make use of the resources of a computer, computer system, or computer
network");N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-23 (a) (West 1995); VT. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 4101 (1)
(1998 & Supp. 2000).

ANN. CODE art. 27, § 146 (1996 & Supp. 1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.099 (West 1999); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-1347 (Michie 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.4765 (3) (k) (2000); N.H. REV.
STAT. § 638:17 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-32 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-45-5
(Michie 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-454 (b) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08 (1997);
OtHO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.04 (B) (Banks-Baldwin 1997 & Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1953 (1) (West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.377 (Supp. 1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3933 (Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-52-3 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-43B-1 (Michie
1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-602 (b) (1) (1997); TEX. PENALCODE ANN. § 33.02 (West 1994
& Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-703 (1) (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4102 (1998 &
Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.120 (1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-504 (a) (Michie
1999).
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Another thirteen states use very similar definitions to those presented in
the table.1 48 California, Maine, Hawaii and Oklahoma) define access as
"entry" into a computer system. 49 The federal computer fraud statute

148. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.990 (a) (Michie 2000) ("to instruct, communicate with,
store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise obtain the ability to use the resources of a computer,
computer system, computer network, or any part of a computer system or network"); 720 ILL.
COMP. LAWS 5/16D-2 (West 1998) ("to use, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve
or intercept data from, or otherwise utilize any services of a computer"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:73.1 (West 1997) ("to program, to execute programs on, to communicate with, store data in,
retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources, including data or programs, of a
computer, computer system, or computer network"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 146 (a) (9) (1996
& Supp. 1999) ("to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from,or otherwise make
use of equipment including, but not limited to, computers and other data processing equipment or
resources connected therewith"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.792 (1) (West 1991 & Supp.
2000) ("to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve or intercept data from, or otherwise
use the resources of a computer program, computer, computer system, or computer network");
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-1 (2000) ("to program, to execute programs on, to communicate with,
store data in, retrieve data from or otherwise make use of any resources, including data or
programs, or a computer, computer system or computer network"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.4732
(2000) ("to intercept, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve from or otherwise make
use of any resources of a computer, network or data."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-45-2 (Michie
1997) ("to program, execute programs on, intercept, instruct, communicate with, store data in,
retrieve data from or otherwise make use of any computer resources, including data or programs
of a computer, computer system, computer network or database"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-453
(1999) ("to instruct, communicate with, cause input, cause output, cause data processing, or
otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, computer system, or computer network"); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-52-1 (1) (2000) ("to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, enter
data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of, a computer, computer
system, or computer network"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-16-10 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1998)
("to instruct, communicate with, attempt to communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or
otherwise make use of or attempt to make use of any resources of a computer, computer system,
or computer network."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-702 (1) (1999) ("to directly or indirectly use,
attempt to use, instruct, communicate with, cause input to, cause output from, or otherwise make
use of any resources of a computer, computer system, computer network, or any means of
communication with any of them"); W. VA. CODE § 61-3C-3 (2000) ("to instruct, communicate
with, store data in, retrieve data from, intercept data from, or otherwise make use of any computer,
computer network, computer program, computer software, computer data or other computer
resources").
149. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (b)(1) (Deering 1998 & Supp. 2001) ("to gain entry to,
instruct, or communicate with the logical, arithmetical, or memory function resources of a
computer, computer system, or computer network"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-890 (1) (Michie
1999) ("to gain entry to or communicate with a computer, computer system, or computer
network"); ME. STAT. REV. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 431 (West Supp. 2000) ("to gain logical entry into,
instruct, communicate with, store data in or retrieve data from any computer resource"); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 1952 (1) (West Supp. 2000) ("to approach, gain entry to, instruct, communicate
with, store data in, retrieve data from or otherwise use the logical, arithmetical, memory or other
resources of a computer, computer system or computer network").
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(Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) protects only limited class of computers;
the most broadly-defined category of computers are those involved in
interstate or international communication.J" The CFAA criminalizes
intentionally accessing and obtaining unauthorized information from a
computer across state or national boundaries. 51 The federal computer
fraud law does not define access.52
2. Developments Limiting Application of Computer Fraud Laws
The homogeneity may be evidence of legislative inexperience rather
than a well-tested regime for criminal liability. 53 Viewing warning
banners and password prompts by unauthorized users constitutes
communicating with a computer and receiving data from computers. As
such, those activities would fall under a stringent interpretation of most
definitions of access and would trigger liability. Such an interpretation
would not provide users with notice that a use is unauthorized. Interaction
with any computer connected to the Internet satisfies most statutory
definitions of "access." The boundary of liability falls back to the
authorization or consent of the computer owner. Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc. provides one unsettling example of how easily liability can be
incurred. 1' Addressing Register.com's CFAA claims based on Verio's
access to Register.com's public WHOIS database, the court notes simply
"because Register.com objects to Verio's use of search robots they
represent an unauthorized access to the WHOIS database." 155 Although
the court did base Verio's liability for trespass to Register.com's chattels
on the Verio's notice that its access of the WHOIS database was
unauthorized, it is unclear whether the court also based the CFAA claim
on notice. 56 In any event, because liability expands and contracts at will,

150. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e) (2) (B) (2000).
151. See 18 U.S.C. 1030 (a) (2) (C) (2000).
152. See 18 U.S.C. 1030 (e) (2000).
153. "Approximately half of the states modeled their statues primarily on the 1977 or 1979
versions of the proposed 'Federal Computer Systems Protection Act,' while the remainder enacted
comprehensive computer assisted crime statutes less closely related to the proposed federal
legislation." Laura Nicholson et. al, ComputerCrime, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 207, 249 (2000).
154. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
155. Id.,at251.
156. See id., see also id., at 249 (citing CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc, 962
F.Supp. 1015, 1024 (S.D. Ohio 1997)).
(I]t is clear since at least the date this lawsuit was filed that Register.com does not
consent to Verio's use of a search robot, and Verio is on notice that its search
robot is unwelcome. Accordingly, Verio's future use of a search robot to access
the database exceeds the scope of Register.com's consent, and Verio is liable for
any harm to the chattel (Register.com's computer systems) caused by that
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the threat of liability could interactions on the Internet. Moreover,
computer owners have no incentive to implement technical measures to
exclude others. Technical measures would function more efficiently than
judicially imposed sanctions, if only because they do not involve the same
chill on interactions with the Internet.
The overexpansiveness of these laws has contributed to the
unpredictability of their application; courts are resistant to interpreting
statutes' full potential scope. For example, in State v. Rowell, the New
Mexico Supreme Court found that the New Mexico computer fraud statute
could not be applied a defendant who defrauded his victims over the
telephone.'5 The court found that the fraudulent calls were made through
"computerized switches" and that the defendant's action's "resulted in the
access of computerized switches, and in fact access to a computer or a
computer network."'58 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the "access
of such components is not the type of conduct the legislature sought to
punish by the Act."' 59 Furthermore, in State v. Allen, the Kansas Supreme
Court substituted a dictionary's definition of "access" in place of the
"tortured translation of the definition . . .provided" by the Kansas
computer fraud statute, rather than hold the statute unconstitutionally
vague.'6 ° This interpretation favored the defendant, where the defendant
had called a Southwestern Bell computer but where there was no evidence
that the defendant had attempted to respond to the password prompt. 6 ' At
the same time, the court resisted the state's argument that Southwestern
Bell's investigative costs were the measure of the defendant's damage to
Southwestern Bell's computer system. The court commented that "a fitting
analogy [is] that the State is essentially saying that a person looking at a
no trespassing sign on a gate causes damage to the owner of the gate if the
owner decides as a result to add a new lock."' 6 2 In Moulton v. VC3, a
federal court found that the costs incurred investigating a port scan did not
constitute damages under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.63
Moreover, the court found that a party's port scan did not access the other
party's network.'" Port scans elicit information from computers and

unauthorized access.
Compuserve, 962 F. Supp. at 1024
157. State v. Rowell, 908 P.2d 1379 (N.M. 1995).
158. Id., at 1384.
159. Id.
160. State v. Allen, 917 P.2d 848, 852 (Kan. 1996).
161. See id., at 853.
162. Id.
163. See Moulton v. VC3, No. 1:00-CV-434-TWT (D.Ga. Nov. 6, 2000), available at
http://pub.bna.com/eclr/00434.htn.
164. See id.
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computer networks; under many of the state statutory definitions above,
port scans do access computers and probably would constitute computer
crime. Certainly, the court could have found port scans to constitute access
under the CFAA and found the party liable for the port scan. Moulton may
signify that there is a threshold of network activity below which courts
will not interfere. 65
However, not all state statutes provide for such expansive liability. A
small minority of states, Connecticut, Ohio, New Hampshire and West
Virginia, provide affirmative defenses to offset the expansiveness inherent
in "access" when defendants reasonably believed that they were authorized
or could not have known they were unauthorized. 16 Massachusetts
criminalizes knowing, unauthorized access and failure to terminate access
after becoming aware that access is unauthorized.167 Moreover, the
Massachusetts statute states that the requirement of a password constitutes
notice that access is limited to authorized users.'6 Massachusetts has made
some provision to limit liability and, more importantly, given a concrete
guide to the limits of access. New York, on the other hand, criminalizes
only unauthorized use where "the computer utilized is equipped or
programmed with any device or coding system, a function of which is to
prevent the unauthorized use of said computer or computer system."' 69
This qualification was held to limit liability in People v. Angeles, where
a defendant obtained and sold a copy of the Empire Car Service's
customer list and the prosecution failed to allege that Empire Car Service's
computer system had any sort of computer security system.' 70 Instead the
court noted that
The legislative history of the statute makes clear that this
requirement was included on the ground that "[s]uch
protective devices provide the first line of defense against
unauthorized intrusion into a computer system." . . . The
Legislature thus put computer owners on notice that in order
to receive the protection of the criminal statute, they must
equip their computers with some kind of protection
171
mechanism, such as a password requirement or a lock.

165. Cf.eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 1058 (N.D. Ca. 2000).
166. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-251 (b)(2) (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 638:17
(I) (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.04 (c) (Banks-Baldwin 1997 & Supp. 1999); W. VA.
CODE § 61-3C-17 (a) (1) (2000).
167. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120F (West 2000).
168. See id.
169. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney 1999).
170. 687 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999).
171. Id. (citing Mem of Attorney-General in support of L 1986, ch 514, 1986 NY Legis Ann,
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While password prompts and warning banners may lie just beyond a
common-sense threshold of access, there are many times where computer
crime occurs without encountering a password prompt. Moreover, there
may be situations where consideration limited to password prompts will
not adequately analysis the entire bundle of rights inherent in computer
property connected to the Internet.
3. Translating "Access" into Real Life on the Intemet
The application of access-based computer crime laws could damage the
digital commons as much as the current formulation of trespass on
chattels. The efficiency of communication on the Internet stems from the
implied consent to use the computer resources and information of others'.
Legal rules that extend liability to any access whatsoever damage that
efficiency. Consider how trespass to chattels and access-based computer
crime laws would function on the Internet. These laws implicate the most
rudimentary network functions, like pinging an IP address to see if a
network host is connected to the Internet, let alone initiating a TCP
connection that would provide the basis for communicating that access is
unauthorized.
The benefit of the fences in cyberspace metaphor is an enhanced
capacity for precision. Application of the metaphor of fences in
cyberspace could create a legal regime capable of much finer distinctions
between liability and non-liability. Consider a situation where the law
assigns a privacy right to the computer owner over the kind of operating
system running on the computer. (This privacy right is, and should remain,
a hypothetical situation. The overall utility of such a privacy right is
questionable. While discovering the identity of a target's operating system
is an integral step to breaking into the target, it is poor security to rely on
the obscurity of the operating system's identity.) 7 1 In cyberspace,
information about the kind of operating system is an object. This
hypothetical posits that the owner has the legal right to put a fence around
this object. Individuals on the network can use techniques like banner
grabbing, port scanning or nmap's OS fingerprinting to identify the

at 233; Governor's Mem approving L 1986, ch 514, 1986 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at
3173 ["The bill is prophylactic as well as punitive. The computer industry is encouraged ...
to
devise codes to limit unauthorized use"]; Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws
of NY, Book 39, Penal Law art 156, at 284 [device or coding system requirement was incorporated
into the law "in order to encourage greater self-protection on the part of the computer industry").
172. See STUART MCCLURE ET AL, HACKING EXPOSED: NETWORK SECURITY
SECRETS AND SOLUTIONS 51 (1999).
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owner's operating system.'73 Most "fences" would protect against bannergrabbing; banners must be either changed or eliminated.' 74 Port scanning
can be prevented by shutting down unnecessary applications and through
using firewalls that filtered packets on the basis of port numbers. 75 These
measures would create a fences that encompasses more of the information.
Finally, preventing nmap-type OS fingerprinting requires using a firewall
that filtered on a packet-by-packet basis or altering the TCP/IP stack of the
computer. 176 These measures would enclose most of the remotely available
information about a computer's operating system. A court deciding
whether to assign liability would first inquire into what technical measures
were used; the court must find the fences in cyberspace. Next, the court
must decide whether the technical measures were reasonable. The
computer owner who failed to protect against banner-grabbing should not
have legal recourse when banner grabbing identifies his operating system.
A computer owner who used a firewall that prevented port scans but not
nmap-type OS fingerprinting might establish a strong case for liability
against a nmap scanner. Then again, perhaps the cost of preventing nmaptype OS fingerprinting might be found minimal; the court might assign
liability only where the defendant used other means to get the information.
The point of the exercise above is that the metaphor allows courts to
distinguish between relative degrees of care that the owner has taken to
restrict information flows.
Courts striving for equitable and predictable distinctions between
liability and non-liability receive little help from the language of the law;
most current laws could be used to penalize any interactions on the
Internet between networked computers. To be efficient, the law must also
be capable of precision and coherency, even more so because information
flows on the Internet can be very complex. The cyberspace fences
metaphor can help provide that precision.
C. "Trusted Systems" and Conflicted PropertyRules
1. From 'Trusted Systems" to the Law
Software creates "trusted system" by disabling some of the usual
capabilities of the computers on which it is run.'" 'Trusted systems" are
granted some privileges in return for accepting the limitations placed on

173. See Section I.B,supra.
174. See Fydor, supra note 78; Farrow, supra note 81.
175. See Fydor, supra note 79.
176. See Farrow, supra note 81.
177. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES, DIGITAL SECURITY IN A
NETWORKED WORLD 309-312 (2000); LESSIG, supra note 7,at 128-30. 138-39.
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them. Increasingly, software publishers are turning to "trusted system"
technology to enforce agreements with software users. 78 Mostly, software
publishers use "trusted system" technology because of their concern that
their copyrights would otherwise by violated by users copying and
distributing an infinite number of perfect digital copies. 179 ,Trusted
system" technology is used to prevent users from copying and distributing
copyright owners' works."* In this context, "trusted system" technology
is also called rights management systems.' 8 t"Trusted system" technology
is also used to ensure that the players of Internet-based games to not use
illicit technology to cheat. 8 2 The client/user side of "trusted system"
technology is very vulnerable, because users are free to study methods of
attacking the technology at their leisure. Commentary on the seemingly
innocuous example of Internet games shows how difficult it is to
implement effective "trusted system" technology.' 83 The most salient
example of client side attacks on rights management system is the failure
of the Secure Digital Music Initiative standard.18 4The vulnerability of the
client side of "trusted systems" technology has led one computer security
authority, Bruce Schneier, to declare: "there is no way to trust a client-side

178. See Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems at http /www.sciam.com0397/issue/0397/stefikl .htmI
(March 1997).
179. Authors are wary of entering this market because doing so exposes their works
to a higher risk of piracy and other unauthorized uses than any of the traditional,
current modes of dissemination. Therefore, authors may withhold their works
from this environment. Further, even if authors choose not to expose their works
to this more risky environment, the risk is not eliminated. Just one unauthorized
uploading of a work onto a bulletin board, for instance - unlike, perhaps, most
single reproductions and distributions in the analog or print environment - could
have devastating effects on the market for the work.
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T COM., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF
THE WORK GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 21 (1995) available at
<http:llwww.uspto.gov/webloffices/comdoc/ipnm/lipniu.pdf>.
180. See Mark Stefik, supra note 182.
181. See, e.g., Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000).
182. See Matt Prichard, How to Hurt the Hackers: The Scoop on Internet Cheatingand How
You Can CombatIt, athttp:lwww.gameasutra.comlfeaturesl20000724/pritchard-Ol.htm. (Jul. 24,
2000).
183. See id.
184. The SDMI standard was a watermarking technique that would have interacted with MP3
players and recorders, preventing copying. Researchers at Princeton, the Xerox PARC, and Rice
claimed to have found a way to circumvent SDMI. See Edward Felton, Statement Regarding the
SDMI Challengeat http://www.cs.prineton.edu/sip/sdmi/annoucement.html (last modified Dec.
1,2000).
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program in real usage" and that, in fact,
8 5 it is not possible to implement
effective "trusted system" technology.
Recognition of the inherent vulnerability of "trusted system"
technology led to the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.1 6 The DMCA
prohibits the circumvention of technological measures that effectively
control access to copyright owner's work, as well as the manufacture and
distribution of technologies of devices whose principle purpose is such
circumvention. 187 The DMCA also prohibits the manufacture or
distribution of devices or technologies that circumvent technological
measures that effectively protect the rights of copyright owners.' The
DMCA provides exceptions for nonprofit libraries, educational institutions
and archives,'8 9 law enforcement activities,' 9° reverse engineering,' 9'
encryption' 92 and security research 93 and the protection of personally
identifying information.'
Violations of the DMCA are punishable
civilly 95 and criminally.19
Many criticisms of the DMCA focus on the DMCA's failure to
accommodate fair use. Fair use is a defense against a claim of a copyright
holder for copyright infringement.'97 Fair use is encompasses traditional
prerogatives of copyright users,'" including First Amendment rights to
free speech.' 99 "Trusted systems" are not required to incorporate fair use

185. SCHNEIER, supra note 181, at 310.
186. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2000).
However, it is clear that technology can be used to defeat any protection that
technology may provide. . . . [TIechnological protection likely will not be
effective unless the law also provides some protection for the technological
processes and systems used to prevent or restrict unauthorized uses of copyrighted
works.
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T COM., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF
THE WORK GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 21 (1995) available at
http:llwww.uspto.gov/webloffices/con/docipniilipnii.pdf.
187. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2000).
188. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (b) (2000).
189. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (b) (2000).
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (e) (2000).
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (f) (2000).
192. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (g) (2000).
193. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (j) (2000).
194. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (i) (2000).
195. See 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000).
196. See 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2000).
197. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
198. See Cohen, supranote 181 (Cohen describes how copyright users traditionally have been
able to anonymously use lawfully purchased works).
199. First Amendment protections [are] . . . embodied in the (Copyright] Act's distinction
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exemptions into their functionality, but circumventing "trusted system"
technology for fair uses still results in civil and criminal penalties under
the DMCA.2 ° This concern with the DMCA was borne out by the
Copyright Office's exemptions for encrypted lists of websites blocked by
filtering software applications and literary works (including computer
programs) protected by access control mechanisms that fail to permit
access because of malfunction, damage or obsoleteness. 201 The Copyright
Office made explicit statements about the fair use values that necessitated
the filtering software exemption:
[R]eproduction or display of the lists for the purpose of
criticizing them could constitute fair use.... [A] persuasive
case was made that the existence of access control measures
has had an adverse effect on criticism and comment, and
most likely news reporting, and that the prohibition on
circumvention of access control measures will have an
adverse effect. Thus, it appears that the prohibition on
circumvention of technological measures that control access
to these lists of blocked sites will cause an adverse effect on
noninfringing users since persons who wish to criticize and
comment on them cannot ascertain which sites are contained
in the lists unless they circumvent. 2 2
The Copyright Office also made reference to the First Amendment
issues implicit in the public dissemination and discussion of the sites
blocked by filtering software, especially where adults using public
libraries might not by able to receive speech because of the filtering
software. °3
2. Application of the Metaphor
The DMCA fits well into the language of the metaphor. Copyrighted
works are a property in real life and in cyberspace; access to that property
is controlled by technological fences. After satisfying the license

between copyrightable expressions and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use ... [C]opright's idea/expression
dichotomy strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression.
Harper& Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539, 546, 556 (1985).
200. See Cohen, supra note 181, at 987-993.
201. See 65 Fed. Reg. 64555, 64562.
202. Id., at 64564 (citing Microsystems Software, Inc. v. ScandinaviaOnline AB, No. 001503 (1 st Cir. Sept. 27, 2000).
203. See id.
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requirements for access, a user is permitted access, but the ability to copy
and distribute data in his own computer is fenced off. Although the work
is on the computer owner's cyberspace, he or she is not able to control it.
The DMCA' s threshold of liability coincides precisely with the metaphors.
Circumvention of technical measures are jumping over fences in
cyberspace are equivalent and prohibited.
In this way, the DMCA creates consistent and coherent rules and
provides copyright owners' strong incentives to use technical measures
before turning to courts. UniversalCity Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,the first
application of the DMCA, found the application of the law "clear," and
that there was "no serious question" that the defendant's behavior violated
the statutory provisions in the DMCA.?
3. Whose Property Rights Trumps?
Although the DMCA coincides precisely with the metaphor, the
significance of the metaphor to critical analysis of the DMCA merits more
than a perfunctory discussion. The DMCA controversy raises the issue
what residual property rights of computer owners remain after using
copyrighted software with DMCA-protected technical measures. This
question is more complicated than identifying computer owner's a priori
property rights. How should the law permit software to curtail computer
owners' property rights who knowingly and willingly run the software?
This question encompasses issues with obvious answers, like viii and
trojan horses. It also encompasses more ambiguous matters. Lawsuits have
been filed against against software publishers whose software gathered
information about users without explicitly saying so2 5 and against
America Online, whose software made it difficult to revert to competing
Internet access providers and web browsers after installation.2 The merit
of these lawsuits may well hinge on the availability of technical measures
that would have prevented or reversed the harm at issue. Analyzing those
lawsuits from the perspective of the fences in cyberspace metaphor, the
liability of the defendants depends on whether they circumvented technical
measures implemented by the computer owner. The transfer of cookies can
be prevented by proper configuration of the browser, while the
configuration of Internet connectivity software may be substantially more
complicated and controlling the effects of installed software is extremely
204. 111 F.Supp.2d 294,304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
205. See In Re RealNetworks PrivacyLitigation,No. 00 C 1366,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6584

(N.D. 111. May 11, 2000); Supnick v. Amazon.com, No. COO-0221P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7073
(W.D. Wa. May 19, 2000).
206. See In Re American Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litigation, No. 1341, 2000 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 13262 (J.M.P.L. Jun. 2,2000).
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difficult. Preventing or reversing the harm caused by America Online is
much more difficult for most consumers than preventing the harm caused
by Internet advertisers using cookies.
For computer owners to enjoy their property rights, implementation of
technical measures that control software will be increasingly needed. The
problem is that technical measures employed by computer owners will
conflict with technical measures implemented by software publishers.
Technical measures implemented by the computer owner protect and
control his property, while technical measures implemented by copyright
owners provide control over their work at the expense of the computer
owner. One easily analogized example of a brewing technological conflict
between consumers and website operators over banner ads and cookies.
Many website operators employ banner ads to subsidize their operations.
At the same time, users resentful of the privacy implications employ
software that manipulates cookies and prevents banner ads from loading.m
Reacting to this software, some web site operators use technical
countermeasures to prevent browsers that won't load ads from loading at
all. 2°8 Others have responded with threats to boycott or to sue the
publishers of this software, under the theory that use of the software
violated the web site operators' copyright. 2° 9 This technological struggle
does not beg the question of whether the consumer or the web site operator
have property rights in their respective computers and the information on
them. They should both retain rights in their property. Instead, this
struggle begs the question of who has yielded those rights. Has the
consumer yielded his property rights over his computer by loading a web
page and is he now required to display the page however web site operator
wishes? Or has the web site operator yielded his right to control his data
by making the web page publicly accessible over the Internet? Returning
to DMCA considerations, to the extent that property rights can and should
coincide with effective technical measures protecting property, whose
rights should dominate, computer owners or copyright owners?
Arguments against the DMCA have not yet considered the effect of the
DMCA on the property of computer owners. Although it may be
effectively countered by theories of implied or explicit consent, this

207. See Junkbusters, The Internet Junkbuster Proxy or Guidescope's? Which ad blocking
software is rightfor you? at http://www.junkbusters.com/guidescope.html (Sept. 9, 2000).
208. See Dwight Silverman, "Adding and Subtracting; With banner ads ubiquitous on the
Internet, more software is being developed to block the intrusions," HOUSTON CHRON., Jul. 23,
1999, at 1; Kristi Coale, Intellicast Smartens Up to Banner Bypass at
http://www.wired.comnews/technology/0,1282,2844,00.html (Mar. 28, 1997).
209. See Janet Cornblum, CNET.com, Ad filtering catching on? at
http://news.cnet.comtnews/0-1005-200-326551.html (Feb. 13, 1998).
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argument at least addresses the loss of functionality and property rights
computer owners must accommodate to avoid liability under the DMCA.
V. CONCLUSION

The fences in cyberspace analysis addresses shortcomings in modem law.
Certainly, the metaphor trims back overexpansive doctrines of trespass on
chattels and statutory computer crimes. The metaphor also describes the
controversy over the DMCA in terms of property rights, instead of fair use
and copyright. But the fences in cyberspace metaphor provides for a more
precise and coherent line between property rights, the DMCA discussion
shows that it does not address the underlying allocation of property rights.
The analysis provided by the metaphor comes full circle, hopefully with
a clearer conception of the practical values involved.

